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Abstract—Especially in context of critical urban infrastruc-
tures, trust in IoT data is of utmost importance. While most
technology stacks provide means for authentication and encryp-
tion of device-to-cloud traffic, there are currently no mechanisms
to rule out physical tampering with an IoT device’s sensors.
Addressing this gap, we introduce a new method for extracting
a hardware fingerprint of an IoT sensor which can be used for
secret-free authentication. By comparing the fingerprint against
reference measurements recorded prior to deployment, we can
tell whether the sensing hardware connected to the IoT device
has been changed by environmental effects or with malicious
intent. Our approach exploits the characteristic behavior of
analog circuits, which is revealed by applying a fixed-frequency
alternating current to the sensor, while recording its output
voltage. To demonstrate the general feasibility of our method,
we apply it to four commercially available temperature sensors
using laboratory equipment and evaluate the accuracy. The
results indicate that with a sensible configuration of the two
hyperparameters we can identify individual sensors with high
probability, using only a few recordings from the target device.
Index Terms—Internet of Things, Trust, Secret-Free Authen-
tication, Fingerprinting, IC Identification, Analog Sensors
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things (IoT) technology provides a promising
path towards improved monitoring and control of critical urban
infrastructures such as transport systems, water networks, and
telemedicine systems [1]. With the stringent security require-
ments of these application domains, reliable means to establish
trust in the sensor data streams is of absolute necessity.
Established cryptographic protocols can be used to protect the
data from malicious third parties while it traverses the fog.
However, in many cases IoT nodes are situated in physically
vulnerable, publicly accessible spots, where attackers can gain
access to a device and tamper with its peripherals. In other
words, even if a device’s identity has been established and
is therefore trustworthy, how can we verify that the signals
coming from its sensors are trustworthy as well? In the
literature, this problem is called sensor-crypto separation [2]
and generally refers to the possibility of intercepting signals
between an analog sensing device and the IC processing the
results.
In this paper, we address the problem of sensor-crypto
separation with a novel method for fingerprinting the sensors
connected to an IoT node. Our method is based on the
application of alternating currents to the sensor inputs and
reading the sensor outputs. Before deployment of a sensor-
Fig. 1. The sensor-crypto separation problem: While traffic between the
IoT device and the cloud is encrypted, an attacker can manipulate the
measurements while they traverse the wire between sensor and device.
equipped device, a broad frequency spectrum is scanned and
the results are stored in a database. Later, when a device wants
to prove that its sensing hardware has not changed, it transmits
the responses to a small set of probe frequencies. The remote
party can then compare the received responses with the ones in
the database and, based on their deviation, decide whether the
configuration is likely to have changed in-between deployment
and the current response or not. Identification granularity can
be divided into two categories:
• Inter-device identification distinguishes between different
sensor models.
• Intra-device identification distinguishes between different
instances of the same model.
Of course, the latter is more difficult than the former, and any
method that can reliably distinguish between sensor instances
can also distinguish models. Using a set of commercial
off-the-shelf (COTS) IoT sensors and standard laboratory
equipment, we demonstrate the general feasibility of our
approach and discuss its strengths and limitations. We
conclude that our method is powerful enough to perform
inter- and intra-device identification with bounded error.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: First, we
introduce a few relevant concepts in Section II and discuss
related publications in Section III. Then, we introduce our
method in Section IV and evaluate it for several commer-
cial IoT temperature sensors using precision measurement
equipment in Section V. Finally, in Section VI we provide
a discussion of the results, before we conclude the paper and
highlight our plans for further improvements in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND
The fingerprinting technique discussed in this paper relates
to some concepts from the security domain, which are briefly
introduced below.
a) Challenge-response authentication: Some of the fin-
gerprinting techniques discussed in Section III are based on
the challenge-response principle: To authenticate a device, the
remote party sends a question (“challenge”) for which the
local party must produce a valid answer (“response”). Before
deployment, the system is bootstrapped, which means that
for all possible challenges, the corresponding responses of
the target system are recorded and stored. Later, checking
the validity of any single response corresponds to a simple
comparison with the database of challenge-response pairs. For
reliable identification the device should consistently produce
the same response to a given challenge and no two devices
must produce identical responses to all available challenges).
Hardware implementations of the challenge-response principle
predominantly rely on process variation during manufacturing
to ensure uniqueness.
b) Secret-free authentication: Cryptographic schemes of-
ten include the establishment of a shared secret between the
involved parties that is used for authentication and encryption.
Naturally, a wide range of attacks have been devised that
focus on extracting the secret, e.g. using malware or through
some physical side channel. To eliminate this class of attacks,
researchers are trying to develop secret-free schemes, where
everything about both ends of a conversation is known and
yet an attacker has no way of impersonating one or the other
party [3]. Current examples of secret-free authentication are
presented in the next section.
III. RELATED WORK
Many IoT solutions rely on Low-Power Wide Area Network
(LPWAN) technology for communication and the popular
implementations support block cypher encryption between
devices as well as application server. Therefore, the research
community has primarily focused on identifying the type of
node connected to a network based on the observed network
traffic [4]–[6]. To the best of our knowledge, no works have
been published that go beyond the end device to determine if
its sensor configuration has changed. In the following sections,
we revise fingerprinting methods that rely on similar physical
characteristics as the one described in this paper, despite
the fact that they were not specifically developed for IoT
applications.
A. (Public) Physical Unclonable Functions
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are special circuits
designed to specify a device with a unique and unclonable
identity for authentication. The circuit takes a bit pattern
as input and deterministically produces another bit pattern
as output. Process variations during manufacturing make the
mapping between inputs and outputs unique and prevents an
attacker vom physically duplicating the circuit. In the recent
past, PUFs have fallen slightly out of favor due to their
susceptibility to a class of attacks which use Machine Learning
to simulate the PUF behavior [7].
This weakness was later addressed through the introduction
of Public Physical Unclonable Functions (PPUFs) [8].
Everything about a PPUF’s circuit is public knowledge and
yet the system is designed in a way that an attacker cannot
simulate the device efficiently, i.e. simulating a response takes
significantly longer than just physically producing it with
the original circuit. By verifying the timing of the response
in addition to its correctness, the remote party can verify
that it is dealing with the real device and not a simulation
of it. The PUF principle can be transferred to various kinds
of materials that are also subject to process variation, such
as CDs and sheets of paper [9]. In this case, the medium is
called unique object (UNO) and the fingerprint is revealed
using a high-resolution measurement device, such as a
microscope. UNOs and PPUFs constitute prime examples
of secret-free cryptographic systems and are based on the
same principle as our method: To reveal unique properties of
physical objects that result from process variations.
Both PUF and PPUF have been suggested as suitable
technologies for authentication protocols in IoT ecosystems.
In most cases, the circuit is directly integrated with the IoT
node or added as a peripheral identification module. But there
have also been efforts to combine a sensing circuit and a
fingerprint circuit into a sensor that can do both at the same
time: measuring a target observable and identifying itself.
In [2] the authors propose to fuse a photosensor with a PUF
to produce a device that signs each measurement with a
response before it leaves the PUF circuit. Similar schemes have
been described for measuring pressure [10] and voltage [11],
and capacitance [12] respectively. Others go further and use
the environment-dependent behavior of a PUF directly for
sensing [13], albeit with serious limitations: While they prove
that it is possible to detect faults injected into the devices
power supply, it remains an open question whether the idea
can be transferred to sensors for other physical quantities.
Unfortunately, all approaches in which a sensor is directly
combined with a PUF introduce dedicated circuits, which
means they are incompatible with COTS sensors currently on
the market. Our method addresses this gap by revealing the
uniqueness of a sensor itself instead of relying on the entropy
of a PUF circuit.
B. Smartphone and Radio Fingerprinting
In the recently emerging field of smartphone fingerprinting,
the goal is to identify a smartphone remotely with high
probability by revealing the uniqueness of its internal sensors.
One of the earliest methods was developed by Dey and
colleagues [14] and aims to identify a phone via its built-
in accelerometer. Specifically, the challenge is produced in
the form of a vibration from the internal mechanical vibrator
and consecutively, the response is captured as accelerometer
readings. Inconveniently the success of their method depends
on the surface on which the phone is laying. To overcome that
limitation, another approach was soon proposed by Bojinov et
al. [15]. Here, the challenge is emitted through the phone’s
speakers in the form of an auditory signal and simultaneously
recorded as a response using the microphone. Their method
does not require the device to be in a specific physical location
but still depends on a relatively noise-free environment in order
to work properly. Finally, integrated schemes were described
for combining the fingerprints of multiple sensors for more
reliable identification [16], [17]. A comprehensive review of
the literature on smartphone identification can be found in [18]
as well as a discussion of relevant attacks in [19].
For devices without built-in sensors and actuators, physical-
layer identification techniques focus on unique characteristics
of the analog radio circuitry in wireless transceivers [20]. They
are subsumed under the term RF-DNA and construct models
of the device classes from the observed radio communication
using methods like Wavelet transform [21] or Hilbert Huang
transform [22].
IV. METHOD
The main idea behind our fingerprinting method is to reveal
the characteristic properties of a sensor’s analog circuit and
use them for secret-free authentication: Due to the resistive,
inductive, and capacitive parts, an analog circuit behaves like
a harmonic oscillator upon being stimulated with alternating
current (AC). The response is determined by the circuit’s
layout, the attributes of individual electronic components, the
frequency of the AC voltage, and environmental conditions
such as air temperature or local magnetic field. Thus, assuming
we can control or at least account for the influence of environ-
mental factors, we can distinguish two sensors by comparing
their responses to various input frequencies. The granularity
of identification depends on the resolution of the measurement
equipment, since the difference in behavior among circuit
layouts is orders of magnitude larger than the difference due to
process variation. It should also be noted that the characteristic
behavior of the devices should be revealed at the operational
limits of input parameters as specified in the datasheets. E.g.
if a sensor’s operational voltage range is specified as 3.3V to
5V, we should test around 3.3V since going above 5V could
damage the device. The intuition behind this is, that the circuits
are designed with certain in-built tolerances and compensation
mechanisms within the supported ranges that would conceal
characteristic behavior.
A. Fingerprint Extraction
Our approach follows the challenge-response principle:
The sensor is supplied with an oscillating voltage of a fixed
pattern and frequency (challenge). Oscillation range and
waveform are selected according to the capabilities of the
available hardware. Meanwhile, its output voltage Vout is
sampled for a certain number of steps and used to compute
specific parameters of the output waveform (response). In
the following, we focus on effective value and variance
but briefly discuss other options in Section VI. Since the
responses of two different sensors can happen to coincide
for some frequencies, multiple such challenge-response pairs
must be recorded to reduce the number of false positives.
A schematic representation of our method is given in Figure 2.
Fig. 2. Overview of the proposed challenge-response scheme. (1) AC with
fixed frequency is applied to the sensor’s inputs. (2) The response is recorded.
B. Authentication scheme
The fingerprinting method is used as part of an authen-
tication scheme that proceeds similarly to how PUF-based
authentication works. Prior to device deployment, a bootstrap-
ping step is performed. This is essentially a sweep over a
predefined frequency band with the responses for each point
being recorded. The resulting set of challenge-response pairs is
denoted as full fingerprint of the target device and must be kept
secure with the trusted remote party. Depending on the IoT
architecture and network topology, this might be a cloud server
or an edge node. Then, the sensor is connected to an IoT
node and deployed to its designated location. To authenticate
the sensor in the field, first the corresponding IoT node
is authenticated using a standard authentication mechanism.
Then, a set of challenge frequencies called partial fingerprint
is chosen according to a predefined pattern and the responses
are sent to the backend for verification. Here, we deviate
from the usual process of PUF-based authentication: In order
to reduce communication overhead and conserve power of
the IoT node, we do not transmit the challenge from the
remote endpoint to the device but instead apply a hashing
function locally to the current timestamp to obtain a set of
input frequencies. If the partial fingerprint deviates from the
responses of the full fingerprint by no more than a specified
margin, we consider the authentication to be successful and
can assume that the measurement originated from the same
circuit that was bootstrapped previously.
V. PRELIMINARY EXPERIMENTS
To verify the general feasibility of our approach, we
conducted a series of experiments on real IoT sensors using
laboratory equipment as presented in Figure 3. Specifically,
we use a Rigol DG812 function generator to produce the
input oscillations and measure sensor output voltage with a
Rigol DS1054Z oscilloscope. The digital-to-analog converter
(DAC) inside the function generator offers a resolution of
16 bits with a sampling rate of 125 MSa/s, whereas the
oscilloscope’s analog-to-digital converter (ADC) has 8 bit
resolution and a sampling rate of 1 GSa/s. The transferability
of the results to inexpensive, low-power IoT hardware is
discussed in Section VI. The sensors are listed in Table I and
are all available in the TO-92 packaging. The frequencies
are taken from the range [103Hz, 106Hz] in 1 kHz steps,
i.e. fin ∈ {1000, 2000, . . . , 10
6Hz}. In this paper, we limit
our considerations to computing the root mean square (RMS)
(also called effective voltage) of the recorded output signal.
The RMS is an equivalent voltage which represents the DC
voltage value that would produce the same heating effect, or
power dissipation, in the circuit, as the applied AC voltage.
Fig. 3. Our experimental setup consisting of a function generator (a), an
oscilloscope (b), and the sensor (c).
TABLE I
SENSOR HARDWARE USED IN OUR EXPERIMENTS.
TMP36 LM61 MCP9700 LMT85
Min/max temp. (°C) -40/+125 -30/+100 -40/+150 -50/+150
Accuracy (°C) ± 2 ± 2 ± 1 ± 0.7
Min/max supply (V) 2.7/5.5 2.7/10 2.3/5.5 1.8/5.5
Supply current (µA) 50 125 6 5.4
Manufacturer AD TI Microchip TI
Our experiments shall give an insight on the granularity of
identification that can be achieved using the proposed method:
Inter-device identification aims to distinguish between two
different circuit layouts, whereas intra-device identification
relies on differences between identical circuit layouts due to
process variation. The latter is of course the more difficult
task, requiring more precise equipment and being less likely
to succeed.
A. Full Fingerprints
First, we qualitatively compare full fingerprints between
different sensor models over the entire 1 MHz band. Figure 4
displays RMS and variance per 1 kHz step for the four
tested models. Solid lines represent the average value over
three independent measurements with approximately the same
environmental temperature (δT ≈ .5
◦C). Shaded areas around
the curves show the standard deviation σ. The dots in Fig-
ure 4a mark the measured output voltage of the sensors when
supplied with 3.3V DC at room temperature. These values
are identical for TMP36 and LMT85 so their points coincide.
Visual inspection suggests that with the exception of a few
crossing points, the differences between device models are
large enough for reliable identification. Interestingly, the vari-
ance of TMP36 never exceeds 10−6, indicating exponentially
(a) (b)
Fig. 4. (a) Output RMS per sensor model. Lines represent average RMS,
shaded areas represent confidence intervals (2σ). The small dots at the right
hand side mark the output voltage of each sensor model in normal operation
mode and at room temperature. (b) Output variance per sensor model.
increasing dynamic impedance. We also observe MCP9700 to
entirely shut down for a certain band of frequencies around
100 kHz. This could be due to a high reactance but further
analysis is needed since the datasheets are inconclusive in this
regard.
For intra-device variation, we take an exemplary look at
the output RMS of three different instances of the MCP9700
sensor in Figure 5. The input domain (x axis) is narrowed
to the first 100 kHz for increased readability. Again, solid
lines correspond to mean values while shaded areas visu-
alize the standard deviation w.r.t. multiple measurements of
each device. Visual inspection reveals differences beyond the
confidence intervals but quantitative analysis is needed before
conclusions can be drawn.
Fig. 5. Output RMS per sensor instance in the range up to 100 kHz
(MCP9700).
B. Sensor Identification
Following the authentication scheme presented above, we
recall that a partial fingerprint is constructed from the RMS
responses to a set of challenge frequencies. Authentication
then proceeds by computing the deviation of the partial finger-
print from the previously obtained and stored full fingerprint.
The root mean square error (RMSE), or identification error,
is used to quantify the difference between a target partial
fingerprint and the reference full fingerprint. For a given full
fingerprint Xˆ consisting of responses xˆi, i = 1, . . . , |Xˆ| and
(a) (b)
Fig. 6. Evaluation of the two hyperparameters. (a) RMSE for different sizes
of the partial fingerprint. (b) Precision, recall and F1 score for various settings
of θ.
a partial fingerprint X with |X | = P << |Xˆ|, we compute
the RMSE as follows:
ǫ :=
√√√√ 1
P
P∑
p=1
(xˆp − xp)2 (1)
In PUF-based authentication, usually the hamming distance
is used, because responses consist of bit sequences instead
of a set of real numbers. It is reasonable to assume that the
identification error decreases with an increasing number of
points per partial fingerprint. We assess this assumption by
showing mean RMSE values for different partial fingerprint
sizes |X | in in Figure 6a. In total, 1000 matchings between
randomly chosen partial fingerprints and the corresponding full
fingerprint were performed per device and partial fingerprint
size. We only compare RMSE of target device matching with
that of intra-device matching because the inter-device RMSE
is orders of magnitude higher and would distort the graph
significantly. The graph confirms that with larger number of
points per partial fingerprint, the difference between intra-
device RMSE and target device RMSE increases and thus
the identification error decreases. Additionally, we observe
the standard deviation of RMSE to be nearly constant across
fingerprint sizes for matchings with the target device itself,
whereas it decreases for intra-device comparisons. While the
general implication seems to be “the more points per partial
fingerprint, the better”, we have to keep in mind that this
parameter is also subject to practical constraints, since larger
fingerprints require more power to record and communicate.
Once the RMSE between partial and full fingerprint has
been calculated for the target device, a decision needs to
be made whether the device under scrutiny really is the
expected one. A straightforward approach is to define a
threshold parameter θ and declare a given partial fingerprint
to not match the corresponding full fingerprint if the RMSE
lies above that threshold. In Figure 6b, we investigate
the relationship between fingerprinting accuracy and the
threshold parameter θ. Accuracy is operationalized as F1
score which is calculated from the classical information
retrieval concepts precision and recall. The resulting curves
for θ ∈ [0.001, 0.02] and 10 points per partial fingerprint
are displayed in Figure 6a. As expected, recall improves
for increasing θ up to a certain point because higher values
TABLE II
IDENTIFICATION ACCURACY.
FN FP (inter) FP (intra)
TMP36 6.5% 0% 1.7%
MCP9700 2.2% 0% 29.9%
LM61 1.3% 0% 0%
LMT85 1.5% 0% 94.3%
correspond to a larger tolerance for deviations between partial
and full fingerprint, e.g. due to noise. With higher thresholds,
the system would also accept fingerprints that differ due
to process variation, resulting in an increasing number of
intra-device false positives. The best setting for θ under the
tested conditions seems to be around θ = 0.01 where the F1
score is maximal.
Finally, in Table II, we report the number of false positives
(FP) and false negatives (FN) per device and granularity for a
fixed partial fingerprint size of 10 and θ = 0.01. All numbers
are given with respect to 1000 matchings. The results show
that there is, on average, a 2.9% chance of a false mismatch
with a fingerprint of the target device (false negative) over
all four models. This residual error is probably connected to
small fluctuations of the environmental temperature, which
is further discussed in the next section. Just as with PUF
authentication, in such a case, another authentication attempt
could be initiated, reducing the probability for a false negative
to 0.084%. As for false positives, the results indicate we
would never mistake another model for the target device, but
multiple instances of the same model can be misclassified as
false positives. This effect is less severe for some models, e.g.
LM61 and very severe for others, e.g. LMT85. Looking again
at Figure 4 we intuitively understand why this is the case: The
full fingerprint of LMT85 has nearly constant RMS and very
low variance for input frequencies above 200 kHz. Hence for
this sensor, in practice, we should constrain the fingerprinting
to regions of the spectrum, where intra-device variance of the
target device is high in order to achieve good results.
VI. DISCUSSION OF PRACTICAL FEASIBILITY
Our results show that analog fingerprinting is a suitable
method for both inter- and intra-device identification. As
indicated before, a few open questions have to be addressed
before the approach can be used in critical IoT applications.
First, appropriate electrical components for generating the
challenges (DAC) and reading the responses (ADC) have
to be identified and tested. The component properties
must be balanced with respect to resolution, price and power
consumption in order to be viable for large-scale deployments.
Currently, there are a number of candidate devices for such
purposes on the market which will be tested in the next
phase of our research. In the same step, the accuracy of the
approach could be improved by measuring the jitter curves
of the ADC and DAC to account for their disturbance in
the fingerprints. Actually, we should account for the filter
between DAC and sensor as well, which also has a significant
influence on the quality of the input signal and thus on the
reliability of the fingerprint. It might also be possible to use
chips as used for Impedance Spectroscopy (IS) which contain
high precision DAC, ADC, and some additional circuits
to compute high-level features such as Discrete Fourier
Transform (DFT). Likewise, the ADC could be replaced with
an RMS-to-DC converter circuit to avoid recording multiple
samples for manual RMS computation and thus save power.
Another critical question for the success of our
method concerns the sensitivity of the device to changing
environmental conditions. That is, does the fingerprint change
linearly with respect to the environmental temperature?
Many IoT temperature sensors, including the four devices
under scrutiny in this paper, provide so-called linear slope
characteristics within the specified operation temperature
range1. The linearity is intended to allow for a first-
order transfer function between measured voltage and
sensed environmental temperature which simplifies device
integration. The reason why this is important for us is that
during bootstrapping of the full fingerprints, the ambient
temperature is very likely to differ from when the partial
fingerprint is recorded. Recall that in our experiments, this
difference was controlled within 0.5◦C. However, if the
effects on the fingerprint are linear, we can use efficient
convex optimization methods to obtain a reliable fingerprint
and at the same time determine the ambient temperature
from the shift between partial and full fingerprint. In
other words, the fingerprint would implicitly contain the
target observable, thus effectively fusing measurement with
authentication. Another solution would be to record multiple
full fingerprints for different temperatures and use big data
analysis methods to verify an incoming partial fingerprint.
Finally, IoT applications in critical infrastructures usually
ensure fault tolerance through sensor redundancy, which could
be exploited for cross-verification of individual fingerprints
between co-located nodes.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a new method for fingerprinting
sensors connected to an IoT node for secret-free authen-
tication. The approach proceeds by challenging the device
with a fixed-frequency alternating current, while observing the
effective voltage at its outputs as the response. We tested four
commercially available IoT temperature sensors using RMSE
error to compute pairwise similarities between fingerprints.
Our results show that the approach is, with bounded error,
suitable for both inter- and intra-device identification. We
further elaborated on the effects of two hyperparameters
contained in our method, the size of a partial fingerprint
and the threshold for the matching error. While the former
is subject to a tradeoff between power consumption and
accuracy, the latter balances false positives and false negatives.
1cf. e.g. https://www.analog.com/media/en/technical-documentation/data-sheets/TMP35 36 37.pdf
Next steps with our approach include the implementation
using low-power IoT hardware and the integration of varying
environmental conditions into our fingerprint model.
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